The Tractatus rejects the sign of assertion as “logically meaningless”, but the rejection of the sign did not lead Wittgenstein to reject the corresponding notion. I show the presence and the importance in the early Wittgenstein of a notion keenly similar to Fregean and Russellian logical assertion. I propose to call this notion “affirmation.” The preparatory writings and the TLP 1 present different theories about affirmation. The correct understanding of the nature and purpose of affirmation proves critical in order to confront another issue about the Tractatus: the only partial similarity between the theory of pictures and the theory of propositions.
|Titolo:||Assertion and Affirmation in the Early Wittgenstein|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2011|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||2.1 Contributo in volume (Capitolo o Saggio)|