Price of pareto optimality in hedonic games

Price of Anarchy measures the welfare loss caused by selfish behavior: it is defined as the ratio of the social welfare in a socially optimal outcome and in a worst Nash equilibrium. A similar measure can be derived for other classes of stable outcomes. In this paper, we argue that Pareto optimality can be seen as a notion of stability, and introduce the concept of Price of Pareto Optimality: This is an analogue of the Price of Anarchy, where the maximum is computed over the class of Pareto optimal outcomes, i.e., outcomes that do not permit a deviation by the grand coalition that makes all players weakly better off and some players strictly better off. As a case study, we focus on hedonic games, and provide lower and upper bounds of the Price of Pareto Optimality in three classes of hedonic games: Additively separable hedonic games, fractional hedonic games, and modified fractional hedonic games; for fractional hedonic games on trees our bounds are tight.