In order to avoid the complete bankrupt of epistemology, Quine has proposed to naturalize it. The risk of bankrupt was due, among other things, to some foundationalist inspirations common to the neopositivists. Nowadays this proposal has been seriously considered by researchers working in the philosophy of language and mind. In particular, many people try to naturalize intentionality and the connected semantic notions. Jerry Fodor, which is one of the main advocate of this project, defends the distinction between observation and inference so to avoid any serious commitment to foundationalism. However, in defending this distinction he is caught in a serious problem: either he has to abandon the causal assumption of his information semantics or he has to embrace a strong form of foundationalism. Because he cannot choose the first solution, he is doomed to foundationalism. One may then think that the very project of naturalization is so self-defeating. However, this is not the case. There are, I argue, two ways in which "naturalization" can be construed: one strong(the one endorsed by Fodor), the other weak. Ruth Millikan, which endorses this last form of naturalization, avoids any charge of foundationalism, showing that the naturalization project is not self-defeating.

Naturalization and foundationalism in epistemology. A problem for J.A. Fodor's semantics

GOZZANO, SIMONE
2000-01-01

Abstract

In order to avoid the complete bankrupt of epistemology, Quine has proposed to naturalize it. The risk of bankrupt was due, among other things, to some foundationalist inspirations common to the neopositivists. Nowadays this proposal has been seriously considered by researchers working in the philosophy of language and mind. In particular, many people try to naturalize intentionality and the connected semantic notions. Jerry Fodor, which is one of the main advocate of this project, defends the distinction between observation and inference so to avoid any serious commitment to foundationalism. However, in defending this distinction he is caught in a serious problem: either he has to abandon the causal assumption of his information semantics or he has to embrace a strong form of foundationalism. Because he cannot choose the first solution, he is doomed to foundationalism. One may then think that the very project of naturalization is so self-defeating. However, this is not the case. There are, I argue, two ways in which "naturalization" can be construed: one strong(the one endorsed by Fodor), the other weak. Ruth Millikan, which endorses this last form of naturalization, avoids any charge of foundationalism, showing that the naturalization project is not self-defeating.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11697/11774
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