Motivated by the increasing interest of the Computer Science community in the study and understanding of non-cooperative systems, we present a novel model for formalizing the rational behavior of agents with a more farsighted view of the consequences of their actions. This approach yields a framework creating new equilibria, which we call Second Order equilibria, starting from a ground set of traditional ones. By applying our approach to pure Nash equilibria, we define the set of Second Order pure Nash equilibria and present their applications to the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, to an instance of Braess’s Paradox in the Wardrop model and to the KP model with identical machines.

Extending the notion of rationality of selfish agents: Second Order Nash equilibria

FLAMMINI, MICHELE
2011-01-01

Abstract

Motivated by the increasing interest of the Computer Science community in the study and understanding of non-cooperative systems, we present a novel model for formalizing the rational behavior of agents with a more farsighted view of the consequences of their actions. This approach yields a framework creating new equilibria, which we call Second Order equilibria, starting from a ground set of traditional ones. By applying our approach to pure Nash equilibria, we define the set of Second Order pure Nash equilibria and present their applications to the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, to an instance of Braess’s Paradox in the Wardrop model and to the KP model with identical machines.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11697/12862
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