A Nash equilibrium simulation model for the competitiveness evaluation of the auction based day ahead electricity market

This paper presents a simulation model based on the Nash equilibrium notion for the auction based day ahead electricity generation market. The presented model enhances a previous formalism proposed in the related literature by employing empirical data distributions of the market clearing price as registered by the market authority (e.g. the Independent System Operator). The model is effective when power suppliers with different generation capacities are considered, differently from the starting model that unrealistically assumes equal capacities. The proposed approach aims at evaluating the electricity market competitiveness with regard to the bidder strategies in order to prevent their anticompetitive actions. The framework is applied to a real data set regarding the Italian electricity market to enlighten its effectiveness in different scenarios, varying the number and capacity of participating bidders. The model can be employed as a basis for a decision support tool both for market participants (to define their optimal bidding strategy) and regulators (to avoid collusive strategies). © 2014 Elsevier B.V.