In this paper I argue that recent reductionist’s arguments marshaled by Jaegwon Kim on the causal status of mental properties do not get the point they are aimed at. In particular, in the first part, tackling epistemological issues, I show that Kim’s arguments concerning the heterogeneity of disjunctive properties if accepted would undermine most scientific practice; in the second part, devoted to metaphysical issues, I argue that Kim’s reductive functionalism, if taken as a metaphysical thesis, cannot be applied neither to qualitative states nor to intentional ones. In particular, qualitative states cannot be reduced by Kim’s admissions, while intentional states cannot be reduced given Kripke’s argument concerning the nature of theoretical identifications. Being mental states either qualitative or intentional, Kim’s strategy fails to make his point. Finally, I argue that the mental properties can be interpreted as micro-based properties, so showing that the so-called ‘generalization argument’ either holds or licenses us in crediting mental properties with causal powers.

Second Order Properties: Why Kim’s Reduction Does Not Work

GOZZANO, SIMONE
2003-01-01

Abstract

In this paper I argue that recent reductionist’s arguments marshaled by Jaegwon Kim on the causal status of mental properties do not get the point they are aimed at. In particular, in the first part, tackling epistemological issues, I show that Kim’s arguments concerning the heterogeneity of disjunctive properties if accepted would undermine most scientific practice; in the second part, devoted to metaphysical issues, I argue that Kim’s reductive functionalism, if taken as a metaphysical thesis, cannot be applied neither to qualitative states nor to intentional ones. In particular, qualitative states cannot be reduced by Kim’s admissions, while intentional states cannot be reduced given Kripke’s argument concerning the nature of theoretical identifications. Being mental states either qualitative or intentional, Kim’s strategy fails to make his point. Finally, I argue that the mental properties can be interpreted as micro-based properties, so showing that the so-called ‘generalization argument’ either holds or licenses us in crediting mental properties with causal powers.
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11697/14992
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact