Several cases studies heterogeneous populations of agents playing the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with a possible prior commitment and a posterior punishment for defection. Two different sets of simulations are considered in this work. The first considers non homogeneous populations of mixed agent's types, each behaving according to one of the different strategies considered. The second set of simulations are run in the spirit of genetic algorithms. We consider a population of agents that are defined by a DNA according to which their strategy is probabilistically defined.

Population Dynamics in the Iterated Prisoner Dilemma with Prior Commitment

Caianiello, P
2019

Abstract

Several cases studies heterogeneous populations of agents playing the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with a possible prior commitment and a posterior punishment for defection. Two different sets of simulations are considered in this work. The first considers non homogeneous populations of mixed agent's types, each behaving according to one of the different strategies considered. The second set of simulations are run in the spirit of genetic algorithms. We consider a population of agents that are defined by a DNA according to which their strategy is probabilistically defined.
978-1-7281-2947-1
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11697/161892
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