In recent times, Evans’ idea that mental states could have non-conceptual contents has been attacked. McDowell (1994) and Brewer (1999) have both argued that that notion does not have any epistemological role because notions such as justification or evidential support, that might relate mental contents to each other, must be framed in conceptual terms. On his side, Brewer has argued that instead of non-conceptual content we should consider demonstrative concepts that have the same fine grainess of non-conceptual contents while having conceptual structure. In what follows I will argue that, first, that the notion of demonstrative concept is not viable and, second, that there is an epistemological role for non-conceptual content.

In Defence of non-conceptual content

GOZZANO, SIMONE
2008-01-01

Abstract

In recent times, Evans’ idea that mental states could have non-conceptual contents has been attacked. McDowell (1994) and Brewer (1999) have both argued that that notion does not have any epistemological role because notions such as justification or evidential support, that might relate mental contents to each other, must be framed in conceptual terms. On his side, Brewer has argued that instead of non-conceptual content we should consider demonstrative concepts that have the same fine grainess of non-conceptual contents while having conceptual structure. In what follows I will argue that, first, that the notion of demonstrative concept is not viable and, second, that there is an epistemological role for non-conceptual content.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11697/18828
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