The impersonal is the point of convergence of transcendental enquiry in philosophy. There is no need to presuppose a subject of thought: ‘one’ thinks like ‘it rains’ or ‘it flashes’ and the ‘I’ who thinks is to be understood “as an unfortunate habit of our race or rather, perhaps, as a mysterious instinct, like wasps taking care of their eggs” (Peirce). But has the ‘third person’ really got to the root, or does the beleaguered ego sum conceal unsuspected depths? ‘One’ thinks and the ‘I-subject’ is a superstition, sure, but where does ‘one’ think? The cogito, to function, presupposes a scene. If the ordinary cultural apocalypse we calle déjà-vu has aroused so much interest in contemporary philosophy (from Bergson to Deleuze), it is because it provides an access to the very first person which is the source of reflexivity.
Il cogito e il suo doppio
Rocco Ronchi
2023-01-01
Abstract
The impersonal is the point of convergence of transcendental enquiry in philosophy. There is no need to presuppose a subject of thought: ‘one’ thinks like ‘it rains’ or ‘it flashes’ and the ‘I’ who thinks is to be understood “as an unfortunate habit of our race or rather, perhaps, as a mysterious instinct, like wasps taking care of their eggs” (Peirce). But has the ‘third person’ really got to the root, or does the beleaguered ego sum conceal unsuspected depths? ‘One’ thinks and the ‘I-subject’ is a superstition, sure, but where does ‘one’ think? The cogito, to function, presupposes a scene. If the ordinary cultural apocalypse we calle déjà-vu has aroused so much interest in contemporary philosophy (from Bergson to Deleuze), it is because it provides an access to the very first person which is the source of reflexivity.Pubblicazioni consigliate
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