Alessandro D. Conti Università dell’Aquila alessandrodomenico.conti@univaq.it Materia prima e rationes seminales negli scritti di metafisica di Paolo Veneto The article deals with the conception of prime matter in Paul of Venice and the paradox it seems to lead into: on the one hand, the universe, as it is, in its entirety, has always existed for Paul of Venice, at least virtually and in potency in the mind of God; on the other hand, prime matter has neither an equivalent idea in the divine mind nor an actual reality in creation, even though it is (1) necessary for the existence of the sensible world, (2) the “coffer” in which all the natural forms that can be generated are kept in potency, and (3) the principle by which individual substances themselves are brought into being. Through a study of the ontological status of prime matter in relation to potency and act, the relationship of prime matter to the rationes seminales it contains, and its role in the process of individuation, it will be shown that the paradox is only apparent, since it is the logical consequence of the very essence of prime matter and the many roles it is deputed to fulfil. In fact, prime matter is both pure potentiality devoid of any actuality, and the ultimate and universal substratum from which all the materials of which things are made are drawn – in other words, it is both pura potentia, when considered in itself, according to its own essence, and the universal subiectum, with respect to the natural forms which, by uniting with it, give rise to the various materials of which things are made and to sensible entities. As a pura potentia, i.e. as the possibility of every possible, it cannot in any way exist, i.e. be real, because if it came into existence it would cease to be what it is, the coffer of every possibility. As the receptive substratum of forms, matter is one of the two main components of the true prototype of the real (in the sense of existent) entity, i.e. individual substance. In both cases matter does not need an idea of its own in order to be known by God, but just as (1) it is presupposed by every possible as its general condition of possibility and (2) it is found to be in other as a substratum structured by a formal principle, so in other it is known. For these reasons, God does not need a proper idea of matter to know that it exists and what it is. This is all the more so because the divine ideas by which God knows everything are, for Paul, ideas of species specialissimae, and in them God knows genera, as necessary presuppositions of species, and individuals, as their consequences; but matter is especially bound up to with genera generalissima, if we consider it as pura potentia, and with substantial individuals, if we consider it as universal subiectum, and therefore does not need any other mode of knowledge than that, indirect, of these entities.
“Materia prima e rationes seminales negli scritti di metafisica di Paolo Veneto”
Alessandro D. Conti
2022-01-01
Abstract
Alessandro D. Conti Università dell’Aquila alessandrodomenico.conti@univaq.it Materia prima e rationes seminales negli scritti di metafisica di Paolo Veneto The article deals with the conception of prime matter in Paul of Venice and the paradox it seems to lead into: on the one hand, the universe, as it is, in its entirety, has always existed for Paul of Venice, at least virtually and in potency in the mind of God; on the other hand, prime matter has neither an equivalent idea in the divine mind nor an actual reality in creation, even though it is (1) necessary for the existence of the sensible world, (2) the “coffer” in which all the natural forms that can be generated are kept in potency, and (3) the principle by which individual substances themselves are brought into being. Through a study of the ontological status of prime matter in relation to potency and act, the relationship of prime matter to the rationes seminales it contains, and its role in the process of individuation, it will be shown that the paradox is only apparent, since it is the logical consequence of the very essence of prime matter and the many roles it is deputed to fulfil. In fact, prime matter is both pure potentiality devoid of any actuality, and the ultimate and universal substratum from which all the materials of which things are made are drawn – in other words, it is both pura potentia, when considered in itself, according to its own essence, and the universal subiectum, with respect to the natural forms which, by uniting with it, give rise to the various materials of which things are made and to sensible entities. As a pura potentia, i.e. as the possibility of every possible, it cannot in any way exist, i.e. be real, because if it came into existence it would cease to be what it is, the coffer of every possibility. As the receptive substratum of forms, matter is one of the two main components of the true prototype of the real (in the sense of existent) entity, i.e. individual substance. In both cases matter does not need an idea of its own in order to be known by God, but just as (1) it is presupposed by every possible as its general condition of possibility and (2) it is found to be in other as a substratum structured by a formal principle, so in other it is known. For these reasons, God does not need a proper idea of matter to know that it exists and what it is. This is all the more so because the divine ideas by which God knows everything are, for Paul, ideas of species specialissimae, and in them God knows genera, as necessary presuppositions of species, and individuals, as their consequences; but matter is especially bound up to with genera generalissima, if we consider it as pura potentia, and with substantial individuals, if we consider it as universal subiectum, and therefore does not need any other mode of knowledge than that, indirect, of these entities.Pubblicazioni consigliate
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