We experimentally analyze the performance of a heterogeneous population of agents playing the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma with a possible prior commitment ad a posterior punishment for defection. We argue that the presence of agents with a probabilistic strategy that depends on trust and reputation enforces a better performance of typically cooperative agents.

Cooperating with trusted parties would make life easier

CAIANIELLO, Pasquale;COSTANTINI, STEFANIA;THAKUR, SUBHASIS
2015-01-01

Abstract

We experimentally analyze the performance of a heterogeneous population of agents playing the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma with a possible prior commitment ad a posterior punishment for defection. We argue that the presence of agents with a probabilistic strategy that depends on trust and reputation enforces a better performance of typically cooperative agents.
978-3-319-24308-5
978-3-319-24309-2
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11697/91292
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