We experimentally analyze the performance of a heterogeneous population of agents playing the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma with a possible prior commitment ad a posterior punishment for defection. We argue that the presence of agents with a probabilistic strategy that depends on trust and reputation enforces a better performance of typically cooperative agents.
Cooperating with trusted parties would make life easier
Caianiello, Pasquale;Costantini, Stefania;De Gasperis, Giovanni;Thakur, Subhasis
2015-01-01
Abstract
We experimentally analyze the performance of a heterogeneous population of agents playing the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma with a possible prior commitment ad a posterior punishment for defection. We argue that the presence of agents with a probabilistic strategy that depends on trust and reputation enforces a better performance of typically cooperative agents.File in questo prodotto:
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