In this paper I offer a reconstruction of David Hume’s discussion of personal identity. I argue that, notwithstanding Hume’s description of personal identity in Book 1 of A Treatise of Human Nature in terms of a «bundle of perceptions», he is nevertheless in a position to present a unified conception of the self. This becomes apparent when he moves on to Books 2 and 3 of the same Treatise to talk about the passions of pride and humility. I conclude by suggesting that by putting weight on these passions Hume can arrive at a definition of the self that finds its completion in the ethical dimension.

L’identità personale in David Hume: dalle passioni all’etica

GRECO L
2014

Abstract

In this paper I offer a reconstruction of David Hume’s discussion of personal identity. I argue that, notwithstanding Hume’s description of personal identity in Book 1 of A Treatise of Human Nature in terms of a «bundle of perceptions», he is nevertheless in a position to present a unified conception of the self. This becomes apparent when he moves on to Books 2 and 3 of the same Treatise to talk about the passions of pride and humility. I conclude by suggesting that by putting weight on these passions Hume can arrive at a definition of the self that finds its completion in the ethical dimension.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11697/153205
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