In this essay I reconstruct the role which the principle of sympathy plays in the ethics of Hume. I show that Humean sympathy should not be read in terms of empathy, as many do read it nowadays, and I defend Humean sympathy from those critics for whom it is deleterious to a correct account of morality. I claim that the Humean take on ethics is fundamentally correct: sympathy reveals itself to be indispensable both to finding a common point of view from which to judge morally, and to having a moral perspective that is capable of moving human beings to act according to its dictates.
Titolo: | Simpatia ed etica: in difesa della prospettiva humeana |
Autori: | |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2016 |
Rivista: | |
Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11697/153218 |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 1.1 Articolo in rivista |
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