Can we severe the connection between thought and language? Is language a necessary condition for the presence of thought? These questions lie behind at least two philosophical conundrums, such as the format of mental representations and the possibility of crediting mute animals with intentional states, such as beliefs and desires. More in general, the problem can be stated as follows: does intentionality necessarily have a linguistic format? My purpose in this paper is to argue in the negative. In particular, I will maintain that there are different kinds of intentional states, the difference being fixed by the nature of their content.

Language, Thought, and Mute Animals

GOZZANO, SIMONE
2008-01-01

Abstract

Can we severe the connection between thought and language? Is language a necessary condition for the presence of thought? These questions lie behind at least two philosophical conundrums, such as the format of mental representations and the possibility of crediting mute animals with intentional states, such as beliefs and desires. More in general, the problem can be stated as follows: does intentionality necessarily have a linguistic format? My purpose in this paper is to argue in the negative. In particular, I will maintain that there are different kinds of intentional states, the difference being fixed by the nature of their content.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11697/24148
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