In my paper I maintain that Hume’s moral sentimentalism offers the philosophical tools to redefine the basic notions of virtue ethics in a more efficacious way compared to the opposing neo-Aristotelian model. I argue that the strength of Hume’s version of virtue ethics is that he aims at the unity of character instead of the unity of the virtues. This allows to develop a pluralistic and secularised morality which denies any supposed final cause or télos for human beings conceived as a species, and instead upholds the individuality of the person as the fundamental value which should be pursued and promoted.

Toward a Humean Virtue Ethics

GRECO L
2013

Abstract

In my paper I maintain that Hume’s moral sentimentalism offers the philosophical tools to redefine the basic notions of virtue ethics in a more efficacious way compared to the opposing neo-Aristotelian model. I argue that the strength of Hume’s version of virtue ethics is that he aims at the unity of character instead of the unity of the virtues. This allows to develop a pluralistic and secularised morality which denies any supposed final cause or télos for human beings conceived as a species, and instead upholds the individuality of the person as the fundamental value which should be pursued and promoted.
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11697/153191
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 5
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact